### **K**

#### **Anti-Blackness and slavery is what allows the Monopolization and the accumulation of capital that global corporations engage in. To engage in reforming this system is to engage of a system of Black death making**

**Bledsoe & Wright ‘19**

#### Bledsoe, A. and Wright, W. J. (2019) ‘The anti-Blackness of global capital’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 37(1), pp. 8–26. doi: 10.1177/026377581880510

Global capital and its effects Expressions of violence are often the result of structural arrangements. **Much of** the **routinized violence** of the present day **is tied to** localized manifestations of **global capitalism**. These manifestations have **resulted in new social and spatial relations**, labor regimes, and specific practices of organizing and managing built and “natural” environments, as well as the populations therein. Regarding Afro-descendant populations, these changes result in new manifestations of violence. Cowen and Lewis (2016) argue that anti-Blackness takes on specific characteristics based on “shifts in the social order.” These shifts are part of emerging global political economic trends. Phenomena like white flight, urban renewal, and Black spatial displacement—which have affected the lived experiences of Black populations in the United States—are examples of how urban spaces in the United States have shifted in their social, economic, and material makeup over the past five decades. While capitalism has always had a global reach, the late 20th century saw capitalist power achieve unprecedented levels of influence. This **consolidation of capitalist power** occurred, in part, **as a response to the struggles of racialized populations** and workers’ unions which, in the mid to late 20th century, demanded dignified employment, livable wages, social programs, and land reform, among other things (Gilmore, 2007: 39–40; Harvey, 2007: 7; Kaufman, 2013; Woods, 2017: 188). As a result of the organizing capabilities and political demands made by those in labor movements, the Civil Rights movement, the Black Power movement, and land reform activists, new manifestations of capitalism emerged that worked to reverse and appropriate the gains made by these movements and reify the influence of capitalist actors. Huey Newton diagnosed this phenomenon in 1971, noting that **capital** (specifically within the United States) **has** not only expanded its territorial boundaries but also **shifted its forms of control** such **that there exists a global capitalist power that controls “all the world’s lands and people”** (Newton, 2002: 186–187 emphasis in original). According to Newton, one effect of the expanding reach of global capitalism is that the roles of nation-states fundamentally change. While previously nation-states maintained greater control of the political and economic aspects of their territory, the increased power of capital now means that nation-states’ “self-determination, economic determination, and cultural determination have been transformed by the imperialists of the ruling circle” (Newton, 2002: 170). More specifically, the governing role of **the nation-state has become subordinated to** the agenda of **capital**(ists), so that corporations’ actions “directly structure and articulate territories and populations. They tend to make nation-states merely instruments to record the flows of the commodities, monies, and populations that they set in motion” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 31). In addition, sovereign state actions such as policing, military interventions, state and municipal funding, and taxes (or lack thereof) are increasingly influenced by, and manipulated for, the propagation of global capital. In short, expressions of state sovereignty are co-opted to benefit capital. As global purveyors of capital increasingly replace the nation-state as controllers of sovereign space, the various populations within these formerly bounded territories become subject to a number of shifts. In order to counter labor organizing, capital uses the “spatial fix” to find labor pools and regulations that it can more profitably exploit (Harvey, 2001). This manifests in phenomena like capital flight and “outsourcing,” in which production moves to new locations. It is, in part, through such arrangements that the deindustrialization of cities like Detroit, Milwaukee, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh occurred, as the owners of the means of production moved manufacturing facilities to areas with cheaper sources of labor and less stringent financial and environmental regulations (Boggs, 1968). A result of this geographic rearrangement of production is that labor practices which previously provided stable, long-term, unionized jobs are replaced by “flexible” arrangements defined by temporary, low-paid, insecure, and nonunionized employment. Simultaneously, precarious laborers, now under- and unemployed, occupy neighborhoods where land precipitously drops in value. With time, these undervalued locations become sites of real estate speculation and urban renewal (Marable, 2000; Taylor, 2016). These effects often take on both class and racial characteristics. Newton (2002), for instance, notes how globalized capital leads to increasing numbers of Blacks falling into the category of the lumpenproletariat (196; 210). Classed subordination is not the only (nor necessarily the most fundamental) form of oppression Black people face, however. Indeed, in the modern epoch, **anti-Blackness does not** simply “**follow” global capitalism**. Rather, through perpetual and multifaceted enactments of violence, **anti-Blackness makes possible the** **accumulation necessary for capitalist reproduction.** Violent forms of domination accompany (and make possible) the reproduction of global capitalism. This violence targets all manner of people, specifically those who do not exhibit a form of humanity normalized under Western modernity (e.g., lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) and gender nonconforming folk, Muslims, Latinx, and undoc- umented immigrants) or a manner of spatiality that adheres to the tenets of capitalist notions of individual ownership (Mitchell, 2003). Under this new phase of capitalism, ever-expanding groups of people are subjected to precarious life (Mbembe, 2017). Still, **experiences of anti-Blackness remain unique,** as the openness of Black people to **violence and** the assumed **a-spatial nature of Black populations** remain **constitutive factors of the modern world.** The logics underpinning anti-Black violence are inheritances of chattel slavery. These logics cast Black geographies as empty and threatening, open to occupation, and subject to surveillance and assault. Indeed, capitalism’s perpetuation relies as much on anti-Blackness as it ever has. The following section seeks to clarify the ways in which **anti-Blackness makes capital accumulation possible.**

#### **To reform the global capitalist system to make it more “competitive” perpetuates anti-Blackness and allows anti-Black accumulation to flourish.**

**Bledsoe & Wright ‘19**

Bledsoe, A. and Wright, W. J. (2019) ‘The anti-Blackness of global capital’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 37(1), pp. 8–26. doi: 10.1177/0263775818805102.

A number of phenomena have resulted in public attention to, a refusal of, and organized action against the violence inherent in globalized capital and its expressions of sovereignty. The need for analysis and resistance is particularly evident regarding Black populations, as **global capital** and its attendant sovereignty **have established new rounds of anti-Black, death-dealing** (Gilmore, 2002) realities. In the United States, these realities include the demographic history of Ferguson and white flight in St. Louis; the factors that led to the precarious nature of Eric Garner’s livelihood; and the industrial and political abandonment of the majority Black municipality of Baltimore, to name but a minimum. In each example, **the constitutive relations** of the locations in question **shifted to accommodate**, among other things, the changing **demands of capital**. These relations entailed renewed forms of anti-Black violence which subsequently became flashpoints for Black grassroots organizing. In this section, we take the case of metropolitan St. Louis, Missouri and reflect on how changes in Ferguson’s racial–spatial make up reflect wider societal shifts taking place as a result of global capitalism. Because conditions in Ferguson have pushed conversations around anti-Blackness in the United States, an interrogation of the city’s relation to racial capitalism is appropriate. Following this subsection, we reflect on the ways that Black grassroots organizations diagnose and respond to such violence. Ferguson, MO Alvaro Reyes (2013) contextualizes the murder of Mike Brown by situating the town of Ferguson, Missouri as part of a wider national trend of gentrification, white flight, and policing. Long **steeped in anti-Black violence**, the St. Louis Metropolitan area, of which Ferguson is a part, perpetuates **capital accumulation** in part by **relying on the** disenfranchisement and **premature ending of Black lives**. Beginning in the 1950s, White residents fled St. Louis’ inner city for presumably safer, whiter suburbs like Ferguson. By the 1990s, Ferguson’s population was roughly 73% White, a demographic reality that began to change due to gentrification trends in the mid-1990s—a practice which coincided with the de-industrialization of St. Louis. Both led to the forced removal of inner-city Black residents and their relocation to now cheaper suburbs, such as Ferguson (Moskowitz, 2017). These trends help explain why today, Ferguson has a majority (67%) Black population, 25% of which is below the poverty line (Reyes, 2013). Black displacement from St. Louis’ inner city opened new spaces of investment for global capitalist actors. St. Louis’ Central West End (CWE) is an illustrative example of the ways in which the city is a site of intertwined anti-Blackness and global capital accumulation. Located south of the racialized “Delmar Divide” (Harlan, 2014), the CWE experienced a significant outmi- gration of Black residents in the late 20th century and an influx of White residents in the first decade of the 21st century (Gordon, n.d.a). The **displacement of Black populations** and increase of White populations in inner-city St. Louis **coincided with** a late 20th-century **explosion of** urban renewal mechanisms like enterprise zones, planned industrial expansion, and redevelopment corporations. These phenomena served to classify inner-city spaces pop- ulated by Black communities as “blighted” and in need of development, offering tax incen- tives to a variety of developers while making the locations too expensive for low-income Black communities to remain (Gordon, n.d.b). Today, the CWE is a “trendy” location, replete with hotels, restaurants, bars, and luxury apartments. Complexes like the CWE City Apartments and Citizen Park—both built in the last decade—are examples of how **global capitalist actors profit** from the systematic **displacements of Black communities**. CWE City Apartments are owned by Transwestern (2018), a private real estate firm that “assists clients through more than 180 offices in 37 countries as part of a strategic alliance with [French investment bank] BNP Paribas Real Estate.” Citizen Park, on the other hand, is managed by Asset Plus Companies—a real estate management firm that works with global corporations like ING Bank, Mitsubishi, and Bank of America. These two brief examples demonstrate how, in St. Louis, the **built environment acts as a means of capital accumulation** for global capitalist actors. These **spaces are made available thanks to the spatially superfluous nature of Black communities** which were displaced from this part of the city through a variety of political economic mechanisms. The mechanisms that pushed Black populations out of the CWE subsequently allowed globally active companies to establish profit-producing sites in the same location, while the displaced were forced to move to suburban locations like Ferguson. These conditions are in no way serendipitous occurrences. Instead, **they form part of global political economic realities** that entail specific understandings and uses of space. As **new forms of accumulation**—such as urban renewal and real estate investment—**are implemented to perpetuate capitalism**, new spaces become “open” for occupation, use, and exchange. Notions of certain spaces being available for appropriation depend on ideas of certain populations being unable to adequately occupy or administer space. In the 1950s, St. Louis saw an abandonment of people and resources from the inner city and a fixing of Black people in the same location. The past two decades have witnessed capital reinvest in some of these same spaces, a practice made possible through the expul- sion, dispersal, and policing of Black residents. Thus, as global capital’s role in reshaping metropolitan St. Louis is unquestionable, so, too, is the ethic of anti-Blackness in capital- ism’s current unfolding. In Ferguson, Mike Brown was murdered under conditions of induced resettlement, structural poverty, unequal distributions of political influence and police power, and a fundamental understanding that Black populations lack spatial agency. Such realities are a result of both capital’s needs for new spaces of accumulation and the insistence that Black populations cannot occupy space legitimately. These inter- twined realities of capitalist expansion and structural anti-Blackness led to the dehumani- zation and displacement of Black populations in the St. Louis metropolitan area and disinvestment in their lived spaces. These shifts are hardly specific to St. Louis. Indeed, they constitute a global phenomenon in which capitalism requires that spaces take on new qualities and functions. Of the many political economic factors effecting Black populations in the United States, neither gentrification, deindustrialization, capital flight, nor any other such phenomenon develop by chance (Lees, 2000, 2012; Moskowitz, 2017; Paton, 2014). Rather, these processes are all part of a much larger trend within the global economy that results in a spatial, economic, and cultural reorganization of society. This new ordering of our globe happens in accord with ever-innovating forms of capitalism. Gentrification, in particular, has come to comprise “an increasingly unassailable capital accumulation strategy” by weav- ing “global financial markets together with large- and medium-sized real-estate developers” (Smith, 2002: 443). As **capitalism** enacts new rounds of accumulation through practices like gentrification, its **purveyors** (e.g., real estate developers, financiers, and municipal leaders) **must** find or **create** favorable **conditions for** that **accumulation**. Thus policies, relations, and regulatory identities that once inhibited the free flow of capital (tariffs, unions, Keynesian modes of governance, localized non-capitalist practices, etc.) are increasingly manipulated and done away with to facilitate new rounds of accumulation (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Moskowitz, 2017). As a result, human and nonhuman beings are increasingly at the mercy of capitalism and its exploitations, expropriations, and expulsions (Sassen, 2014). These oppressive spatial processes continually affect Black populations. The spatial fix—described by David Harvey (2001)—preserves and propagates capitalism and also entails a racial fix(ation) as the continuation of accumulation treats certain places and populations as obsolete, in need of appropriation, removal, and erasure. For example, in the midst of efforts to accumulate surplus value through real estate development via the gentrification of Black communities, municipalities attempt to appease Black communities and capitalize on Black cultural/spatial expressions by hemming Black histories into museums as they eradicate the makers of Black history. The African American Library at the Gregory School in Houston’s Fourth Ward, the Houston Museum of African American Culture in Houston’s Third Ward, and the National Museum of African American History and Culture in Washington, D.C. are examples of this phenomenon. Each cultural hub emerged as the neighborhoods and cities in which they are located underwent forms of gentrification that dislocated many Black residents and history makers. Whereas in the early 20th-century suburbanization provided a spatial fix for White families fleeing Black inner-city spaces, urban gentrification results in the inverse, with mostly white young adults returning to urban spaces and effectively expelling low-income Black inhabitants (Freund, 2007; Sugrue, 1996). This process perpetuates “the same age-old, racist process of subsidizing and privileging the lives and preferred locales of the wealthy and white over those of poor people of color” (Moskowitz, 2017: 117). The dismantling of Black communities via gentrification results in a dispersal of long-time residents to suburbs, like Ferguson, where the White citizenry who once fled their forbearers control political, economic, and judicial apparatuses and hold firm to “an internalized suburban logic” of individuality and racial separation (Moskowitz, 2017: 180). In each of these examples, the purveyors of capital accumulation neither view nor treat Black communities as legitimate spatial actors. Emerging forms of **capitalism rely on the** ever-present **logics of anti-Blackness**, which insist on the unviability of Black spatiality. **These logics result in the displacement, murder, and disenfranchisement of Black populations**. Black social movements and political actors are presently analyzing these realities and formulating alternatives to them.

#### **Furthermore, the condition of possibility for modern Antitrust law’ is the master/slave relationship and the slave existing as a commodity of trade.**

#### **Warren, ‘18**

(Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, Duke University Press, “Chapter 2: Outlawing” pp. 62-109)

Although Tuitt’s analysis presents a humanist desire to reclaim the slave as a human agent, despite the fact **the law considers the slave property** alongside inanimate and animate objects, rendering it a subject/object (which I believe is a strategy that only yields contradiction and aporias), her claim that the presence of the slave engenders law provides insight into the relation between law and ontology. **Contract law** (law of chattel) is perhaps the hallmark of modern legal development, given the need to regulate commerce and specify the rights and entitlement of property holders. But this corpus of law **emerges** because one needs **to integrate the slave into the world.** In other words, **contract law** conceals an ontological project: it **uses the discourse of property, chattel, rights, and trade to divide the world into human** subjects [Dasein], those who are entitled to the protection and enforcement of their ontological (non)relation, **and** the world of **things**, those entities lacking such protection of any relation, but **whose existence is necessary for the human** to operate within the world. The law of chattel performs the work of dividing legal seeing from not seeing. Thus, the law of chattel, through the contract form, is predicated upon an ontological difference that it disavows (or more precisely forgets): the difference between Being (the self that is the locus of rights and entitlement, as a stand-in for the ontological [non]relation) and being (the world of objects that support this self). To read Oren Ben-Dor’s postmetaphysical meditation on law through (and against) Patricia Tuitt’s theoretical analysis of contract law, we can suggest that **the** primary **function of chattel law is to protect and enforce** the ground of the **(non)relation**—**this law is ethical to the extent that the rights bestowed to the property holder enable him to project himself into the world of things and to re-member Being.** The destruction of the flesh, the **onticide that renders the slave available equipment, is a legal necessity**, since **contract law depends on it**—the slave is produced through this very violence. Ben-Dor’s suggestion that “**the** essence of law is not legal” provides a hermeneutic for reading and interpreting **law, as always already an ontological enterprise**. Taking chattel law, for example, **the essence of this law is not** the **regulation of commerce** and property rights, **but the** ontological **division the law engenders between** the world of **things** (equipment) **and** the world of the **subject** (the being for which Being is an issue for it—and thus requires rights to discover this issue). Moreover, **this legal division is predicated upon** both Nancy’s “seeing the invisible” and **outlawing black being**. Ethics and freedom are the ontological discourses of law. They perform the crucial work of dividing the world between the free (the human) and unfree (the equipment of the human) and between humans and available equipment. Again, we lose any hint or suggestion of ethics between the human and his equipment (the not there), as Spillers suggests. **The law** of chattel **relies on this** loss of the ethical relation **as a condition of its possibility**—**if the slave** (as chattel) **were to arrive in** the withdrawn place of **Being** and have that inhabitation protected and enforced, **the entire edifice of chattel law** (**a** particular **feature of modern contract law**) **would crumble.** Critical legal theorist Patricia Williams argues that contract law “reduces life to fairy tale.”12 This is the case, since the contract forges a fantasy (a scenario of relations conceived in the actors’ minds)—it transforms imagination into legal obligation. But the **contract creates** not only **the structure of relation** between actors, **but also the object through which the relation is sustained**. In this case, **the black object is constructed**, or invented, **within the vacuum** (or hole) **this structure produces**. Bryan Wagner might describe this vacuum in the contract as **blackness exist**ing **“in exchange without being party to exchange**.”13 The object is exchanged between subjects, but the object itself is not a subject, not a party, within the contract. It exists merely within the black hole of the contract, as that which allows the structure to exist without a subjective existence itself. To exist in exchange is to lack existence outside transaction; **existence for black being is ephemeral and tethered to** the flimsy temporality of the **contract structure**. We might suggest, after Charles Mills, that **an antiblack contract** (a racial contract) **is an instrument for dividing the world** between acting subjects and inactive objects existing only in exchange.14 Thus, **the contract performs important ontological work,** and, for this reason, it has become central to legal metaphysics. Frank Wilderson suggests, “African slavery did not present an ethical dilemma for global civil society. The ethical dilemmas were unthought.”15 The dilemmas are unthought because applying the ethical relation to a being that never arrives and is not seen presents a stupefying conundrum that ethics is unable to resolve. We lack an ontological procedure or grammar to situate the outlawed in relation to ethics. Our ethics are entangled in our ontological commitments. For this reason, black being is unable to appeal even to Levinasian ethics—although he desires to escape the violence of ontology (one might argue this escape is predicated on a misreading of Heidegger, which would mean Levinas leads us right back to Heideggerian ontology). For as Fanon rightly critiques Sartre—which I would argue also applies to Levinas—“The white man is not only The Other but also the master, whether real or imaginary.”16 In other words, **the Other is always already constituted by outlawing—the Law of AntiBlackness.** There isn’t a place in the work of either Heidegger (and neo-Heideggerians) or Levinas that is free from antiblackness. Such a place is a ruse. In his critique of ontology, Fanon argues that “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it upon themselves to remind us that the proposition has a converse. I say this is false. The black man lacks ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.”17 The phrase in relation opens us onto the impossibility of ethics, since ethics would require the very converse of the proposition that Fanon refuses. The black must be for the white man, as equipment in human form—the ontic illusion of humanity. But this being is not the being that grounds ethics or ontology; it is an existence untranslatable into the language of being and ethics (which is why “ontology does not permit an understanding of the black man”).18 This is why black being is an “impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation,” as Fanon would argue.19The procedure of outlawing rests on the severing of both the ethical relation and the ontological relation. This also returns us to the function of law. If, as Oren Ben-Dor avers, Outlawing 75 “To let Dasein gain ground, to let Dasein ground as one with the simple unity of the fourfold, is to be ethical. To let Dasein be open towards its unfolding world as the grounding of its nearest is ethical. To protect and enforce such ground is the essence of law.”20 Then outlawing is a departure from this function. Rather than protecting and enforcing an ontological ground (the ethical demand of Being), **outlawing functions to render black being continuously vulnerable**, accessible, and uncovered. It **employs judicial procedures, discourses, and technologies to sustain this** vulnerability—as **it is the precondition for the Law** of Being.

#### **The resolution is a tactic of metaphysics that forces Black folk to engage in the process of Politics to make capitalism better that kills the Spiritual hope that Black folk need to endure. The idea of a solution within the capitalist legal system that kills black people in order to survive is nebulous and feeds into anti-Blackness.**

**Warren 15** (Calvin L., Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope; Surce: CR: The New Centennial Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, Derrida and French Hegelianism (Spring 2015), XMT, pp. 215-248 Published by: Michigan State University Press Stable URL:<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/crnewcentrevi.15.1.0215> . Accessed: 30/03/2015)

The **politics** of hope, then**, constitutes** what Lauren Berlant would call “**cruel optimism” for blacks** (Berlant 2011). **It** bundles certain **promises** about redress, **equality, freedom, justice**, and progress into a political object **that always lies beyond reach**. The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in a relation to this political object—in an unending pursuit of it. **This pursuit**, however, is detrimental because it **strengthens the** very **anti-black system that would pulverize black being**. The pursuit of the object certainly has an “irrational” aspect to it, as Farred details, but it is not mere means without expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines the attainment of the impossible object desired. In other words, the pursuit marks a cruel attachment to the means of subjugation and the continued widening of the gap between historical reality and fantastical ideal. Black nihilism is a “demythifying” practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that uncovers the subjugating strategies of political hope and de-idealizes its fantastical object. Once we denude **political hope** of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it **operates through certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative** to the problem of anti-blackness, **2) shielding this alternative** [End Page 221] **from rigorous historical/philosophical critique** by placing it in an unknown future, **3) delimiting** the field of **action to include only activity recognized** and legitimated **by the Political, and 4) demonizing critiques** or different philosophical perspectives. **The politics of hope masks a** particular **cruelty under the auspices of** “happiness” and **“life.” It terrifies with the dread of “no alternative.”** “Life” itself needs the security of the alternative, and, through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. **Political hope promises to provide this alternative**—a discursive and political organization beyond extant structures of violence and destruction. **The construction of the binary “alternative/no-alternative” ensures the hegemony and dominance of political hope within the onto-existential horizon.** The terror of the “no alternative”—the ultimate space of decay, suffering, and death—depends on two additional binaries: “problem/solution” and “action/inaction.” According to this politics, all problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility and realization of these solutions. The solution establishes itself as the elimination of “the problem”; the solution, in fact, transcends the problem and realizes Hegel’s aufheben in its constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the “problem” with the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the reach of hope’s solution—every problem is connected to the kernel of its own eradication. The politics of hope must actively refuse the possibility that the “solution” is, in fact, another problem in disguised form; **the idea of a “solution” is nothing more than the repetition and disavowal of the problem itself.** The solution relies on what we might call the “trick of time” to fortify itself from the deconstruction of its binary. Because **the temporality of hope is a time “not-yet-realized,”** a future tense unmoored **from present-tense justifications and pragmatist evidence,** **the politics of hope** cleverly **shields its “solutions” from critiques** of impossibility or repetition. Each insistence that these solutions stand up against the lessons of history or the rigors of analysis is met with the rationale that these solutions are not subject to history or analysis because they do not reside within the horizon of the “past” or “present.” Put differently, we can never ascertain the efficacy of the proposed solutions because they escape the temporality of the moment, always retreating to a “not-yet” and “could-be” temporality. This “trick” of time offers a promise of possibility that can only be realized in an indefinite future, and this promise is a bond of uncertainty that can never be redeemed, only imagined. In this sense, the politics of hope is an instance of the psychoanalytic notion of desire: its sole purpose is to reproduce its very condition of possibility, never to satiate or bring fulfillment. This politics secures its hegemony through time by claiming the future as its unassailable property and excluding (and devaluing) any other conception of time that challenges this temporal ordering. The politics of hope, then, depends on the incessant (re)production and proliferation of problems to justify its existence. Solutions cannot really exist within the politics of hope, just the illusion of a different order in a future tense. The “trick” of time and political solution converge on the site of “action.” In critiquing the politics of hope, one encounters the rejoinder of the dangers of inaction. “But we can’t just do nothing! We have to do something.” **The field of** permissible **action is delimited and an unrelenting binary between action/ inaction silences critical engagement** with political hope. These exclusionary operations rigorously reinforce the binary between action and inaction and discredit certain forms of engagement, critique, and protest. Legitimate action takes place in the political—the political not only claims futurity but also action as its property. To “do something” means that this doing must translate into recognizable political activity; “something” is a stand-in for the word “politics”—one must “do politics” to address any problem. A refusal to “do politics” is equivalent to “doing nothing”—this nothingness is constructed as the antithesis of life, possibility, time, ethics, and morality (a “zero-state” as Julia Kristeva [1982] might call it). Black nihilism rejects this “trick of time” and the lure of emancipatory solutions. **To refuse to “do politics” and to reject the fantastical object of politics is the only “hope” for blackness in an antiblack world.**

#### **There is NO solution to anti-blackness, only the process of refusal and endurance. Endurance is NOT a humanist mandate. Endurance is NOT a piece of legislation that “makes lives MATERIALLY better” Endurance is NOT a hypothetically enacted federal plan that helps Black folk. Endurance is an ontological revolution that accesses that Black spirit and helps Black people survive the metaphysical holocaust**

**Warren, ‘18** (Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, it’s a book, Duke University Press, “Coda: Adieu to the Human,” pp. 170-171, ZW)

What I am suggesting, ultimately, is that black **~~being~~** begins to get over the human and its humanism fantasies. **We’ve tried everything: from marches, to masochistic citizenship** (giving our bodies to the state to brutalize in hopes of evoking sympathy and empathy from humans), **to exceptional citizenship and respectability, to protest and armed conflict; in the end, either we will continue this degrading quest for human rights and incorporation or we will take a leap of faith**, as Kierkegaard might say, **and reject the terms through which we organize our existence. By abandoning the human, human-ness, and the liberal humanism that enshrouds it, we can better understand the violent formations of antiblackness, particularly ontological terror**. **To abandon the human does not mean that one accepts the terms of inferiority or worthlessness.** We do not have to abandon within the axiological framework of humanism; **we can reject that framework as well**. In other words, **we have invested unbelievable value in the human**—it constitutes the ***highest*** value in the world. **And** for this reason, **we are terrified of letting go of it because we believe this value will protect us against antiblackness (it will not). As long as we continue to invest in the value structure that renders the human the highest, and most important, being within the world, we will continue to plead for recognition and acceptance.** It is this ***terror*** of value, of not possessing this value, that keeps us wedded to the idea of the human and its accouterments (and I must say, **constantly revisiting the human, reimagining it, expanding it, and refashioning it does nothing but keep us entangled in the circuit of misery).** This entanglement of value and ontology produces tremendous misery and disappointment for blackness. As Rinaldo Walcott perspicuously states, “**What it means to be Human is continually defined against [blacks]. The very basic terms of social Human engagement are shaped by antiblack logics so deeply embedded in various normativities that they resist intelligibility as modes of thought and yet we must attempt to think them**.”2 We must question the antiblack logics grounding the human, even if such thinking is rendered unintelligible by metaphysical knowledge formations and traditions. **Black thinking, then, must think what is impossible to think within the constraints of metaphysics and ontology. Our enterprise broaches the unknown, the place where we can no longer ask questions, and there sits in this space**. Perhaps **what I am suggesting constitutes an ontological revolution, one that will destroy the world and its institutions** (i.e., the “end of the world,” as Fanon calls it). But these are our options, since **the metaphysical holocaust will continue as long as the world exists.** **The nihilistic revelation, however, is that such a revolution will destroy all life—far from the freedom dreams of the political idealists or the sobriety of the pragmatist.**The important task for black thinking (philosophizing, theorizing, theologizing, poeticizing) is to imagine **black existence** without **Being**, humanism, or the human. Such thinking would lead us into an abyss. But we must face this abyss—its terror and majesty. I would suggest that this thinking leads us into the **spirit**, something **exceeding and preceding the metaphysical** world. We are still on the path to developing a phenomenology of black spirit, but it is an important enterprise. I will continue this work in subsequent writing, but I can say for now, the aim is to shift emphasis from the human toward the spirit. **The spirit** enables one to endure the **metaphysical holocaust**; it is not a solution to antiblackness. The spirit **will not transform** an antiblack world into some egalitarian landscape—**the antiblack world is irredeemable**. Black nihilism must rest in the crevice between the impossibility of transforming the world and the dynamic enduring power of the spirit. **In the absence of Being there is spirit**. Heidegger understands spirit commingled with Being, and the question of Being (“How is it going with Being?”) “is the spiritual fate of the West.”3 Heidegger is both correct and incorrect. The **spiritual** degradation, routinized **violence**, and **suffering** around the globe is a **consequence** of Being and its hegemonic, Eurocentric violence. So, for humans to continue to ask the question of Being is to perpetuates a **spiritual violence of black torment**. The answer to misery is not Being; rather, it is only by **obliterating ~~Being~~** by dis(re)placing Heidegger’s question with “How is it going with black being?” then we can have **access to the spirit**. Being is enmity to the spirit. Contending with black as nothing will set us on this spiritual path. Along this path, we can experience something akin to Ashon Crawley’s concept of breath (without the promises of universal humanism), as the possibility for thinking and breathing otherwise (we can push this thought to its limits and suggest that for black thinking, spiritual breath and thinking are “identical” rather than thinking and being). 4 Black studies will have to disinvest our **axiological commitments** from humanism and invest elsewhere. **Continuing to keep hope** that freedom will occur, that one day the world will apologize for its antiblack brutality and accept us with open arms, **is a devastating fantasy.** It might give one motivation to **fight on**, but it is a drive that will only **produce** exhaustion and **protest fatigue**. **What is the solution?** What should we do? How do we live without metaphysical schemes of **political hope**, freedom, and humanity? I would have to suggest that **there are no solutions** to the problem of antiblackness—**there is only endurance**. And endurance cannot be reduced to biofuturity or **humanist mandates**. Endurance is a **spiritual** practice with entirely different aims. Ontological Terror seeks to challenge metaphysical and postmetaphysical **solutions** . The paradigm of the free black teaches us that such solutions **sustain the metaphysical holocaust**. **Let our thinking lead** us **into** the “valley of the shadow of **death**,” and once there we can begin to **imagine an existence anew**.

#### **The Aff is a structural praxis of contemplation and structural analysis of blackness – mediating on the ethicality of the world is the only starting point for complete transformation**

**Sexton 16**, Jared Sexton is a professor of African American Studies at UC Irvine, nearest date given is 2016, *Rhizomes Issue 29: Black Holes: Afro-Pessimism, blackness and the discourses of Modernity,* “Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word,”<http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/sexton.html>, NN

**Afro-Pessimism is**, in the words of Christina Sharpe, **an attempt "to build a language that**, despite the rewards and enticements to do otherwise, **refuses to refuse blackness, that embraces 'without pathos' that which is** constructed and **defined as pathology**.... I**t is work that** insistently **speaks what is being constituted as the unspeakable and enacts an ethical embrace of what is constituted as** (affirmatively) **unembraceable**." That is to say, **Afro-Pessimism** is both an epistemological and an ethical project, and these two tributaries of thought converge in the carefully navigated stream of consciousness whose abstraction **enables a theorem of political ontology** deduced or **derived from the cutting edge of black studies**: that infinitely narrowing margin of practical-theoretical activity that provides us with weapons. Wilderson once more: **If, when caught between the** pincers of the **imperative to meditate on Black dispossession and Black** political **agency**, we do not dissemble, but instead **allow our minds to reflect on the murderous ontology of**...slavery's **gratuitous violence**—seven hundred years ago, five hundred years ago, two hundred years ago, last year, and today, then maybe, just maybe, **we will be able to think Blackness and agency together in an ethical manner** (143, emphasis added). [16] **There is no rejection of the notion of agency** in advance, **but rather** an endeavor **to think rigorously about its conditions of possibility**. **The procedure involves the abstraction of a conceptual framework regarding structural positionality, a methodology regarding paradigmatic analysis, and a structure of feeling regarding the politics of antagonism** that, taken together, remain implicit in the work of various luminaries of black studies but whose full effects only become available when rendered explicit and approached from another angle or raised to another level of theorization. That is the enabled task and, by and large, it still remains before us now. In a sense, **Afro-Pessimism** is not an intervention so much as it **is a reading, or meta-commentary**, on what we seem to do with, or how we relate to, what black creative intellectuals continue to generate without being able to bring fully into account. **It is a reading of what is gained and lost in the attempt**—the impulse—**to delineate the spatial and temporal borders of anti-blackness**, to delimit the "bad news" of black life, to fix its precise scope and scale, to find an edge beyond or before which true living unfolds. **It is an attempt to resist that centrifugal force that overwhelms** us **like fear or exhausts** us **like fatigue**.[8]

#### **The Aff’s radical negativity refuses questions of political feasibility and liberal choice in favor of changing the coordinates of politics so as to pose a demand in excess of any present imagination – Afropessimism is an ethics of the real which insists on refusal as the foundation for ending the world.**

#### **Barber and Sexton 17** (Daniel Colucciello Barber, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Pace University, PhD in Religious Studies from Duke University, former Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in the Institut für Kulturwissenschaft at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, former Research Fellow at the ICI Berlin, Jared Sexton, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Film & Media Studies at UC Irvine, PhD in Ethnic Studies from UC Berkeley, September 18, 2017, “On Black Negativity, or the Affirmation of Nothing,”<http://societyandspace.org/2017/09/18/on-black-negativity-or-the-affirmation-of-nothing/>)

#### DB: “There is no such thing as a positive aggressive strength, only a negative defensive one.” This remark, as index of an aikido according to blackness, brings to mind a question you ask in one of your recently published articles: **is there** not **a way to think** … **about a violence indifferent to hope**, violence unmotivated by rage, violence irreducible to the dialectics of love and hate? Is there a **violence that**, as Nikki Giovanni once said, simply ‘**cannot take the weight of a constant degradation’** (Fowler, 1992: 96), a violence that operates as a response per se, as what we might call defense without positive content? (2016a). I wonder whether it would make sense to connect the line of thought you’re pursuing here to the question of—the question that ***is***—“the relation between defense and the outstretched hand.” I’m also struck by the resonance between your emphasis, following Wynter, on a mode of thinking that “unfold[s] in a non-linear fashion” and your articulation of negativity within the context of your writing. **Such negativity is inseparable from the demand**—**which is “so much bigger**”—in that it insists, amidst delimitative aggression, on this demand’s unfolding. If one means of delimiting this demand is imposed by the linearity of an “expectation of realization”—by investment in linear temporality, a horizon of the historically successive and successful—**then negativity** insists on, or as, a question of time. Specifically, **it asks *not whether* the demand is realizable, but rather *why* the demand must be thought within, delimited by, the terms of realizability**. In this moment, “**the question posed by and as blackness” seems to emerge as** the seeking, asking, desiring—the offering—of time itself. One of the ways in which I see your work posing this questioning of time, or offering this time of questioning, is through the motif of “interminability.” In fact, I sense that such interminability is at issue in what you’ve here described as “**a ceaselessly universalizing universality” or**, once again, as **a demand in excess of any presently imaginable** form of **realization**. The absence of a term adequate to the demand is also the absence of a terminus and of the calculability that such a point of arrival could claim to make possible. In this vein, you’ve described abolition as “the interminable radicalization of every radical movement” (2016b: 593) and invoked “an ethics of the real, a politics of the imperative, engaged in its interminably downward movement” (2016a). Your elaboration of **this downward**—one might say **unfathomable**—**itinerary draws on** an engagement with David **Marriott’s account of the subjection of black persons to “the interminable time of meaningless, impersonal *dying***” (Marriott, 2007: 230; cited, with emphasis added, in Sexton, 2015: 168). I mention this particularly in view of your remark that **the real** according to which interminability unfolds **is a matter of non-life**. JS: I think you’re right to draw this link between “an aikido according to [or with] blackness” and my earlier, speculative thoughts on black feminist violence as a practice of “response ***per se***, a defense without positive content.” We are, in a very basic way, always responding to the world, to ourselves, to the world in ourselves, to ourselves in the world, more than we are initiating, in thought and action. Any initiative or initiation would seem to be marked as such by a kind of permanent time lag or belatedness in which all thought is afterthought and all action is retroaction. But, then, we are also always active in that fundamental responsiveness, so much so that **even passivity** (whether waiting or resting or languishing) **is a type of activity**, that of our active being, that **which brings forth life from the non-life with which it is commingled**. **Our being is active, but that doesn’t mean our being is always in-action**. **Why, in our political** and **intellectual circles, all the** pointed **concern about activity**, why the worry, or fear, about being misunderstood as passive, individually and collectively**?** And why the close association between being passive and being victim or between passive-being and victim-being? Indeed, **that tension between active/passive** states **provides the** principal **ground for the symbolic and material production of differences of race, gender, sexuality, class**—all differently arrayed for different reasons, of course. I’m reminded, on that note, of a question Wilderson asked me years ago about an often overlooked passage in Fanon, from his critique of Octave Mannoni in Chapter 4 of *Black Skin, White Masks*, where Fanon is meditating on the aim of his vocation as a politically *engagé* mental health clinician. (I have some thoughts, by the way, on what I think Fanon misses in his reading of Mannoni in my article, “Curtain of the Sky”). Here’s the passage: As a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient to become conscious of his unconscious and abandon his attempts at a hallucinatory whitening, but also to act in the direction of a change in the social structure. In other words, the black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, turn white or disappear; but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of existence. In still other words, if society makes difficulties for him because of his color, if in his dreams I establish the expression of an unconscious desire to change color, my objective will not be that of dissuading him from it by advising him to “keep his place”; on the contrary, my objective, once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, will be to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict—that is, toward the social structures (Fanon, 2008b: 74-75). So, Fanon moves initially from this deceptively recognizable psycho-political activist guideline, where the unreason of alienated compliance gives way to the reason of disalienated resistance, to a parenthetical clinical modulation, where he no longer seeks to enable action *per se*, and action in a particular direction at that, but rather *decision*; decision in the proper sense, rather than the forced choice, the *vel*, of hallucinatory whiteness: “turn white or disappear.” **No decision can be made within the terms of a forced choice**, Fanon reveals, only a decision about the terms of its imposition. (Aside: the Philcox translation has it as: “whiten or perish.” I like the Markmann phrasing better here because it stays with the dynamics of hyper/in/visibility that Fanon is exploring, the peculiar problem of overdetermination from without, which is to say of anti-black racialization, of victimized appearance, but also of a certain ethics or aesthetics of disappearance that we can glean from a reading of Fanon. Kara Keeling (2007) and Huey Copeland (2013) and Simone Browne (2015) have elaborated on this nexus generatively in their respective work.)Wilderson’s question was to the effect of: **What would a properly decided, freely chosen, passivity toward the social structure look like?** **Is there such a thing**—ethically, politically—**as *radical passivity*?** (I ended my first book with a slightly modified reference from Thomas Carl Wall’s (1999) text bearing that very title. I wonder about this genuinely still and tend to think, **yes**, there is such a thing.) Žižek, to take another well-known example, has played on the pop psychological notion of “passive aggressive behavior” in his withering critique of so much leftist activism today. In *The Parallax View*, he writes: perhaps, one should assert this attitude of passive aggressivity as a proper radical political gesture, in contrast to aggressive passivity, the standard ‘interpassive’ mode of our participation in socio-ideological life in which **we are active all the time** in order **to make** it **sure** that nothing will happen, that **nothing will really change**. In such a constellation, **the first truly critical** (‘aggressive’, violent) **step is to withdraw into passivity, to refuse to participate**—Bartleby’s **‘I would prefer not to’** is the necessary first step which as it were **clears the ground for** a **true activity**, for **an act that will** effectively **change the coordinates of the constellation** (Žižek, 2009: 342). Now, Zizek’s “Bartleby politics” are obviously not quietist, insofar as they are meant to prepare the way for a true political act. (Frédéric Neyrat [2014] has a related conception: “Rather than its heart, passivity should be the skin of politics. Without passivity, without a ‘negative capability,’ to refer to Keats’s notion, there isn’t any creative imagination, this chaotic imagination that generates the promises of new worlds.” And, not for nothing, Hortense Spillers (2003) makes another, earlier argument for “negative capability” in a pair of essays first published in the 1990s, “The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: A Post-Date” and “All The Things You Could Be By Now If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your Mother: Psychoanalysis and Race.” But the interregnum that opens up between the frenetic, aggressively passive “activism” of the current socio-ideological constellation—in which “the anxious expectation that nothing will happen” competes with “the desperate demand to do something”—and that new constellation brought into being by the introduction of some fundamental indeterminancy—a negativity that is, as you rightly note above, strictly unfathomable—that interregnum would seem to require the cultivation of an oxymoronic *passive activity*. Does it make sense to speak of a need for “passivism” (not to be confused with the homophonic term “pacifism”)? Think of the performative contradiction of trying to relax; the harder you try to attain it, the more it evades you. As every athlete worth their salt knows, your best performance requires your least effort. The more you relax, the more intensely you can exert yourself. In this scenario, you do more the less you try. It’s worth thinking about this seriously in the Trump era (using Trump here as a symbol for the consolidation of a whole post-civil rights, post-cold war, post-9/11 dispensation), given how greatly the ongoing reactionary campaign benefits from and requires any and all imagery of protest, political or pedestrian, as evidence—“alternative factual evidence”—supporting a narrative, ultimately, of white victimization and oppressive black power (and all the conflictual transliterations of this antagonism seen today—from the land and resource battles in the heartland to the travel bans at the borders). Given, that is, how frustratingly ineffective that protest seems to be in the face of an entire infrastructure that not only absorbs resistance, but solicits it too. It makes you nostalgic for the days of good old-fashioned repression and co-optation (days which, of course, never really existed in *black*), because at least then you knew you were on to something truly oppositional, subversive, alternate. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that, under such conditions, black (or blackened) artists are drawn with some regularity to paradoxical ideas about fighting anti-blackness by over-identifying with its desire to disappear or distort or disfigure blackness, essentially taking it over and enforcing it hyperbolically, satirically, even vindictively. I think Paul Beatty’s literature has done this to great effect for twenty years or more—from *White Boy Shuffle* (1996) to *The Sellout* (2015)—and you could add to that titles like Darius James’s *Negrophobia* (1992) and Kola Boof’s *Sexy Part of the Bible* (2011); consider as well the work of Betye Saar and Kara Walker and Michael Ray Charles in the visual arts, the comedy of Dave Chappelle and Leslie Jones, or films like Spike Lee’s *Bamboozled* (2000) and Lars von Trier’s *Manderlay* (2005) and Jordan Peele’s *Get Out* (2017). I don’t want to get too much into the weeds of the current conjuncture and lose track of the larger structural problem posed by blackness and anti-blackness, a problem that confounds the very distinction between structure and conjuncture in the first place. It is not just the exigencies of the present moment or the strategic and tactical challenges facing the Movement for Black Lives that raise the question of how to intervene, of how to introduce “invention into existence,” as Fanon put it. What I’ve called “a groundless or baseless politics that does not proceed from a margin of power, a politics with no (final) recourse to foundations of any sort, a politics forged from critical resources immanent to the situation, resources from anywhere and anyone, which is to say from nowhere and no one in particular” (Sexton, 2016b: 589); this approach to politics would seem to entail a total rejection of transcendence, a politics of pure immanence without the Archimedean point. And in one sense it is, but I am attuned to the difficulties arising from an abandonment of the negative in our enthusiasm for the affirmative, and so I want to think not so much about transcendence viz. immanence as about the various forms or modalities of transcendence and immanence that can be mobilized.

### **FW**

#### **The frame for this debate is the team who has the best response to anti-Blackness. Assuming the positionality of the slave should be the basis of all policy plans because it allows us to interrogate and reckon with anti-Blackness allows for a laundry list of oppressions to be solved.**

#### **We must prioritize solving for anti-Blackness within the Debates Space because that solving anti-Blackness solves every other form of oppressoin**

#### **Sexton 10** – Sexton, Jared. (2010). People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery. Social Text. 28. 31-56. 10.1215/01642472-2009-066.

#### The upshot of this predicament is that obscuring the structural position of the category of blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical opposition and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion**. Every analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule and the machinations of the racial state without accounting for black existence within its framework** — which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought — **is doomed to miss what is essential about the situation.** Black existence does not represent the total reality of the racial formation — it is not the beginning and the end of the story — but it does relate to the totality; it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, **the whole range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this vantage point, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer.75 What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack” paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffering and of the struggles — political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on — that have sought to transform and undo it.** What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness.76 This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them. Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross ﬁre will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the magniﬁcation of state power. At the apex of the midcentury social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 classic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, that black freedom entails “the necessarily total revamping of the society.”77 For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world: I knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without the possibility of ﬂight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. There was no going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet another revolution.78

#### 

#### **We theorize through black time – Ballot Fatigue:**

#### **Black debaters are exhausted. Slavery is still with us and yet most want to run away from sitting within the hold. The structure of Framework is anti-Black domination and forcing debates around Blackness into just the Neg feeds into Whiteness and how it monopolizes what we can say, when we can say it, and how we have to communicate it**

**Warren ‘16**

Black Time: Slavery, Metaphysics, and the Logic of Wellness CALVIN WARREN <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.36019/9780813583983-005/html>

**Exhaustion** is **the contemporary crisis** of black studies. Though affectively unified, it **takes various forms**: the obsession with **everything “post”** (such as postblackness and postracial), **the fetishization of progress** narratives (such as the resurgence of liberal humanism in the academy), **and the stigmatization of those who argue** that emancipation was a political ruse—**that slavery remains with us**. **Our** critical **climate is one of impatience**, **as if we’ve** somehow **exceeded a statute of limitations for discussing slavery**. This exhaustion produces a set of “disavowed desires,” in Aida Levy-Hussen’s words, that recodify *exhausted temporal imaginings* as scientific or objective (see chapter 10). In other words, **the desire** of the exhausted **to enter a temporality beyond slavery**—to inhabit the present—has **structured our discourse about slavery**. The phrase “**getting over**” is yet another index of this intensifying exhaustion— one that figuratively **subordinates the subject of the slave past**, holding out the dubious promise that if we can somehow get over this incorrigible subject, this conceptual-historical surplus, then we might achieve something like wellness, success, possessive individualism, power, agency, and so on. But what exactly are we getting over? What is the slavery that we are so eager to move beyond? At the heart of this compulsion to get over is a crisis of time and objectivity: to get over anything, one must first objectify something and then place this object within a schema of time. In a sense, **this compulsion expresses a metaphysical will to** power, a desire **to dominate time** in the twenty-first century. Thus, it is not surprising that many proponents of getting over-describe slavery using a restricted temporal grammar—slavery was “back then,” “this is now,” “we’re moving forward.” Within this rhetoric, slavery becomes a conquerable object that we can temporize and leave aside; in turn, the act of leaving aside becomes the sign of wellness. In my view, the critical **compulsion to get over slavery is** inextricable from **the constitutive violence of the metaphysical enterprise**. The **aim of metaphysics is domination**. Its function is to capture an event-horizon—something that exceeds metaphysical time—and then transform it into a historical object and dominate it. In contrast, I argue that **slavery is not reducible to an object-event of metaphysic**s; moreover, it comprises an event-horizon that structures western thought itself. **Slavery**, in my analysis, **is an antiblack episteme** that **enables the distinctions between human and nonhuman**, citizen and property, self- possession and dispossession to have meaning. Thus, slavery exceeds the frame of the historical event that we are so eager to get over and indeed provides the condition of possibility for the liberal grammar of humanism that undergirds the compulsion to get over in the first place. In essence, there is no meaning or world without slavery, which is why it is a horizon and not an object. Yet **because slavery has become the metaphysical object** of historiography, subjected to narratives of linearity, movement, and change, **the event-horizon is distorted** as merely one tragic event among others that we can somehow move beyond. **I propose an alternative temporality of slavery**—one that I call ***black time****.* Black time is time without duration; it is **a horizon of time that eludes objectification,** foreclosing idioms such as “getting over,” “getting through,” or “getting beneath.” I use the idea of **black time to critique** the **metaphysical hegemony** and the complicit logic of black wellness predicated on a relinquishment of historical complaint.

#### **Slavery is anti-Blackness through time. General debate discourses objectifies and monopolizes Framework while providing meaning to the Human and dispossessing the slave. Engaging in Black time and forcing debates about how anti-Blackness manifest disrupts this monopoly and benefits education, research and clash**

**Warren ‘16**

Black Time: Slavery, Metaphysics, and the Logic of Wellness CALVIN WARREN <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.36019/9780813583983-005/html>

#### **Slavery is the extremity of antiblackness through time. Imposing metaphysical temporality on the African body** to accomplish the work of objectification is part of the internecine enterprise of slavery. What type of temporality sustains the black body in the hold of the dungeon or slave ship? How do you orient yourself in time and space without any reference, especially when the journey could take months? **Temporal domination is essential to slavery**; its purpose is to disorient, objectify, and terrify. **Not knowing where you are, how long you’ve been there, how long this torment will continue, or if there is an end in sight is part of the domination that separates the white ship captain from the black cargo in the dark hold**. Put differently, slavery works through temporal domination. Blackness is the product of such temporal domination, and metaphysical time is recoded as a feature of racial privilege. **The time of slavery is multidimensional** and cyclical, and antiblackness is a particular colonization of time through black bodies. In “Possible Pasts: Some Speculations on Time, Temporality, and the History of Atlantic Slavery,” Walter Johnson describes certain aspects of temporal domination. According to him, time is a site of contestation, imagination,and terror for beings captured during war, confined to dungeons, boarded on ships, and suspended in the ocean. Time, in a sense, is incalculable for the captive under such conditions. **The “metaphysical horror of a ‘middle’ passage** that some must have thought would never end and others might only have recognized as a trip across the ‘kalunga,’ a body of water which separated the world of the living from that of the dead—a flight from time measured in the gradual physical deterioration of the worldly body”—**compounds the ontological dimension.** Time is instrumentalized to pulverize and dominate the captive on the plantation. Perhaps this is why Frederick Douglass’s master admonished him not to think about a future, for his time belonged to his mas- ter. The captive lives outside of metaphysical time, without a future, without an accessible past (natal alienation), and in a present overwhelmed with the immediacy of bodily pain, psychic torment, and routine humiliation. Time is terror as Johnson writes: One of the many things **slaveholders** thought they **owned** was **their slaves’ time.** Indeed, to outline the temporal claims that slaveholders made upon their slaves is to draw a multidimensional portrait of slavery itself. Slaveholders, of course, defined the shape of the day. Whether it ran from sunup to sundown, whether it was defined by the tasks that had to be done by its close, or was measured out into job scaled clock time, slavery’s daily time was delineated by the master and often enforced by violence. Those who turned up late, quit early, worked too slowly, came up short, or failed to wait deferentially while the master attended to other things were cajoled, beaten, or starved into matching the daily rhythms through which their owners measured progress. As well as quotidian time, slaveholders claimed **calendar time** as their own. They decided which days would be workdays, and which days would be holidays (or holy days); they enforced a cycle of yearly hires and calendar-termed financial obligations. And slaveholders thought they owned the slaves’ **biographical time:** they recorded their slaves’ birthdays in account books that only they could see; they determined at what age their slaves would start into the fields or set to a trade; when their slaves would be cajoled into reproduction; how many years they would be allowed to nurse their children they had, and how old they would have to be before retiring. . . . They infused their slaves with their own time—through the daily process of slave discipline, the foreign, the young, and the resistant were forcibly inculcated with the nested temporal rhythms of their enslavement. Not only did slave masters seize the captive’s body as property, but they also seized his or her time, reifying it into a commodity of exchange and an instrument of torment. The “peculiar institution” of **slavery could not exist without the violent metaphysical process of objectifying time**; this process situ- ated the black being outside the horizon of time that defines the human and into the indistinct zone of temporality—time without duration. We can call this black time. If we think about the way in which time orients the human existentially—birthdays, astrological signs, age, maturation, and so on—we see that **time provides *meaning* for the human.** So **to seize time is**, in essence, to seize the existential condition itself—**to control the production and semiotics of meaning**. Black beings are disoriented within metaphysical time; *they are tempo- rally homeless*. This disorientation provides the necessary existential ground to discipline, punish, and destroy black bodies. Temporal domination is a vicious metaphysical enterprise; its aim is to break down the active will diurnally. Thus, we must consider a fourth temporal dimension in Johnson’s distinc- tions (quotidian time, calendar time, and biographical time): existential time. Existential time is “the Time of Man,” as Homi Bhabha writes: the “temporality of modernity within which the figure of the ‘human’ comes to be authorized.”15 *Ipseity*—that is, making the human proper to itself, the suturing of the self—is only accomplished through the time of man because it provides the necessary conceptual material to orient the self and concretize the boundaries between this self and the external world. To make a slave requires the foreclosure of *ipseity*, requires leaving the self in fragments. (Perhaps this was the existential riddle that W.E.B. Du Bois attempted to solve with his notion of “double con- sciousness.”)16 **Black time is this foreclosure of the self,** and we refer to this foreclosure as dispossession. **The slave is dispossessed** from the self only **to the extent that the slave master can seize his or her time** and *epidermalize* tempo- rality (that is, black time and the time of man). ***Slavery is the*** *vicious* ***enterprise of situating a being outside the time of man*** *and* ***in*** *the abyss of* ***black time.***

#### **Attempts to exclude the 1AC allows Whiteness to continue to monopolize Framework and the Debate space and plays into into the domination and authority that is inherently perceived with Whiteness.**

**Nopper ‘10** Tuesday, January 19, 2010 Tamara K. Nopper: To White Anti-Racists <http://whyaminotsurprised.blogspot.com/2010/01/tamara-k-nopper-to-white-anti-racists.html>

I received an annoying e-mail about white people and their struggle to do anti-racist work. I keep reading and hearing white people talk about their struggle to do anti-racist organizing, and frankly it gets on my nerves. So I am writing this open letter to white people who engage in any activist work that involves or affects non-whites. Given that the US social structure is founded on white supremacy, and that there is **a global order in which white supremacy and European domination are at large**, I would challenge any white person to figure out what movement or action they can get involved in that will not involve or affect non-white people.  That said, I want to begin with what has become a realization for me through the help of different politically conscious friends. There is NO SUCH THING AS A WHITE ANTI-RACIST. **The term** itself, "**white anti- racist" is an oxymoron.** In the following, I will explain why. Then, I will begin to detail how this impacts non-white people in organizing work specifically, along with how it affects non-white people generally. First, one must realize that **whiteness is a structure of domination.** As such, **there is nothing redeemable or reformable about whiteness**. Intellectuals, scholars and activists, especially those who are non- white, have drawn our attention to this for years. For example, people such as Malcolm X, W.E.B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey, James Baldwin, Toni Morrison, Ida B. Wells, Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass, and many, many others who are perhaps less famous, have articulated the relationship between whiteness and domination. Further, people such as Douglass and DuBois began to outline how **whiteness is a social and political construct that emphasizes the domination, authority, and perceived humanity of those who are racialized as white**. They, along with many other non-white writers and orators, have pointed to the fact that it was the bodies who were able to be racialized as "white" that were able to be viewed as rational, authoritative, and deserving. **Further**, and believe me, this is no small thing, **white people are viewed as human**. **What this means is that** when white people suffer, as some who are poor/female/queer, **they** nevertheless **are able to have some measure of sympathy for their plight** simply **because they are white and their marginalization is considered an emergency**, crisis or an issue to be concerned about. Furthermore, **even when white people have been oppressed** by various dimensions of classism, homophobia and heterosexism, they have been able to opt for what DuBois, in his monograph "Black Reconstruction" brilliantly called "the psychological wage of whiteness." That is, **whites** that are marginalized **could find comfort**, even if psychological, **in the fact that they were** not non-**white**. They could revel in the fact that they could be taken as white in opposition to non-white groups. The desire for this wage of whiteness was also what drove many white people, albeit marginalized, to engage in organized violence against non-whites. Of course, **legal cases** such as the Dred Scott Decision along with many different naturalization cases involving Asian individuals, has **helped to encode** a **state-sanctioned** definition of **whiteness**. But there are other ways in which white people can be racialized as white by the state. They are not stopped while driving as much as non-white people. Their homes and businesses are not raided and searched as much by police officers, INS or License and Inspections (L&I). White people's bodies are not tracked and locked up in prisons, detention centers, juvenile systems, detention halls in classrooms, "special education" classes, etc. White people's bodies are not generally the site of fear, repulsion, violent desire, or hatred.Now some might point out to me that white people are followed, tracked and harassed by individuals and state agents such as the police. This is true. Some white women get sexually harassed and experience state-sanctioned discrimination. Queer whites are the subject of homophobia, whether by individuals or by the state through laws and the police. Some queer whites are harassed by cops. Activist whites are stopped by police. White people who play rap music and wear gear are stopped by cops. Poor whites can be criminalized, especially by the state around welfare issues. What I want to point out is that, while I do not condone police violence and harassment, there is a way in which **white people will not be viewed as inherently criminal** or suspect unless they are perceived as doing something that breaks particular norms. Conversely, other racial groups, particularly Blacks and Native Americans, are considered inherently criminal no matter what they do, what their sexual identity is or what they wear. Further, it has always struck me as interesting that there are white people who will attempt to wear what signifies "Blackness," whether it is dreadlocks (which, in my opinion, should be cut off from every white person's head), "gear," or Black masks at rallies. There is a sick way in which white people want to emulate that which is considered "badass" about a certain existential position of Blackness at the same time they do not want the burden of living as a non-white person. Further, it really strikes me as fucked up the way in which white people will go to rallies and taunt the police with Black masks in order to bring on police pressure. What does it mean when Blackness is strategically used by whites to bring on police violence? Now I know that somewhere there is a dreadlocked, smelly white anarchist who is reading this message and who is angry with me for not understanding the logic of the Black masks and its roots in anarchism. But I would challenge these people to consider how they are reproducing a violence towards Blackness in their attempts to taunt and challenge the police in their efforts. Now back to my point that white anti-racism is an oxymoron. Whiteness is a social and political construct rooted in white supremacy. White supremacy is a structure and system of beliefs rooted in European and US imperialism in which certain racialized bodies (non-white) are selected for premature negation whether through cultural, physical, psychological genocide, containment or other forms of social death. White supremacy is at the heart of the US social system and civil society. In short, white supremacy is not just a series of practices or privilege, but a larger social structure and system of domination that overly-values and rewards those who are racialized as white. The rest of us are constructed as undeserving to be considered human, although there is significant variation within non-white populations of how our bodies are encoded, treated and (de)valued. Now, for one to claim whiteness, one also is invested in white supremacy. Whiteness itself is a political term that emerged among European white ethnics in the US. These European ethnics, many of them reviled, chose to cast their lot with whiteness rather than that with those who had been determined as non-white. In short, anyone who claims to be white, even a white anti-racist, is identifying with a history of European imperialism and racism transported and further developed into the US. However, this does not mean that white people who go around saying dumb things such as "I am not white! I am a human being!" or, "I left whiteness and joined the human race," or my favorite, "I hate white people! They're stupid" are not structurally white. Remember, whiteness is a structure of domination embedded in our social relations, institutions, discourses, and practices. Don't tell me you're not white but then when we go out in the street and the police don't bother you or people don't ask you if you're a prostitute, or if people don't follow you and touch you at will, act like that does not make a difference in our lives. Basically, **you can't talk, or merely "unlearn" whiteness**, as all of these annoying trainings for white people to "unlearn" racism will have you think. Rather, **white people need** to be willing to **have their very social position**, their very **relationship of domination,** their very **authority,** their very being...let go, perhaps even **destroyed**. I know **this might sound scary, but that is** really **not my concern**. I am not interested in making white people, even those so-called good-hearted anti-racist whites, comfortable about **their position in struggles** that **shape my life** in ways that it will never shape theirs. I recently finished the biography of John Brown by DuBois. The biography was less of a biography and more of an interpretation by DuBois about the now-legendary white abolitionist. Now while John Brown's practice was problematic in many ways--he still had to be in control and he had fucked-up views that Blacks were still enslaved because they were too "servile" (a white supremacist sentiment)--what I took from Brown's life was that he realized that moral persuasion alone would not solve racial problems. That is, **whites cannot talk or** just **think through whiteness** and structures of white supremacy. **They must be committed to** either picking up arms for other people (and only firing when the people tell them so), dying for other people, or just **getting out of the way**. In short, they must be willing to do what the people most affected and marginalized by a situation tell them to do. Now I am sure that right now there are some white people saying that other people cannot understand what is going on, that they do not have the critical analysis to figure stuff out, or that non-white people have fucked up ideas. This is just white supremacist bullshit because it is rooted in the idea that non-white people have not interpreted their experiences and cannot run things themselves. It also assumes that there are not internal conversations within communities--which I do not think white people need to be privy to or participate in--in which people struggle out their own visions for society and how to go about achieving them. In short, **this perspective** by whites **that non-white people cannot be in control of our own destinies is rooted in a paternally-racist approach** to non-white people. Further, it is also rooted in the idea that white people are not racist or do not benefit from racism. Rather, white people at meetings will often discuss how they feel "silenced" by non-whites, or that they are being "put in their place." Let me make one thing clear: it is impossible for a non-white person to put a white person in her place. This is not to say that non-white people cannot have a sexist or homophobic attitude towards a white person. But to say, or even hint at that as a "WHITE" person someone is being put in their place--whoever says this just needs to shut the fuck up because that is some bull. **It is impossible for whiteness to be put in one's place**, because that is **a part of whiteness**, **the ability to take up space and feel a prerogative to do so**. Further, the idea that white people are being put into their place relies on the neo-conservative view of reverse racism that has characterized the backlash against non-whites, especially Blacks, in the post-civil rights era. So when you say these types of things you are actually helping to reproduce a neo-conservative racial rhetoric which relies on the myth of the "threatened" and "displaced" white person. Additionally, **white activism**, especially **white anti-racism, is predicated on an economy of gratitude.** **We are supposed to be grateful that a white person is willing to work** with non-white people. We are supposed to be grateful that you actually want to work **with us** and that you give us your resources. **I would like to know why you have those resources and others do not?** And don't assume that just because I have to ask you for resources that it does not hurt me, pain me even. **Don't assume that when you come into the space**, that doesn't bother me. Don't assume that **when you talk first, talk the most, and talk the most often, that this doesn't hurt me.** Don't assume that when I see you get the attention and accolades and the book deals and the speaking engagements that this does not hurt me (because you profit off of pain). And don't assume that when I see how grateful non-white people are to you for being there, for being a "good white" person that this doesn't hurt me. And **don't assume that when I get chastised** by non-white people **because I think your presence is unnecessary that it does not hurt me.** Because all of these things remind me of how powerless non-white people are (albeit differently) in relation to white people. **All of these gestures** that you do **reminds me of how grateful I am supposed to be towards you** because you actually (or supposedly) care about what is happening to me. **I am** a bit **resentful of economies of gratitude**. Further, this structure of white supremacy known as **white anti-racism** also **impacts the larger social world** because **it still makes white people the most valued** people. **Non-white people are forced to feel dependent** and grateful **to white people who will** actually **interact with us**. **We are made to feel that we are inferior, incapable**, that we really do need white people. And the sad thing is, that given all of the resources that whiteness has and that white people get and control, there is an element of material truth in all of this, I am afraid. But **white** people need to think of how their **activism reproduces** the actual structure of **white supremacy** some--not all whites activists--profess to be about. **This structure** of white supremacy is not just in an activist space, it actually touches upon and **impinges on the lives of non-white people** who may not be activists (in your sense) or who do not interact with you in activist worlds. But consider what your presence means in a community that you decide to set up your community garden in, or your bookstore in, or your meeting space in, or have your march in. **What does it mean when you** decide that **you want to be "with" the oppressed and** you **end up displacing them**? Just because you walk around with your dreadlocks, or decide that you will not wear expensive clothes does not mean that your whiteness does not displace people in the spaces you decide to put yourself in. How do you help to bring more forms of authority and control in a neighborhood, whether through increased rent and housing costs, more policing, or just the ways in which your white bodies can make people feel, as a brilliant friend of mine once asked, "squatters in somebody else's project"? So what does this mean for the future of white anti-racists? This might mean to first, figure out ways in which **whiteness needs to die as a social structure** and as an identity in which you organize your anti-racist work. What this looks like in practice may not be so clear but I will attempt to give some suggestions here. First, don't call us, we'll call you. If we need your resources, we will contact you. But don't show up, flaunt your power in our faces and then get angry when we resent the fact that you have so many resources we don't and that we are not grateful for this arrangement. And don't get mad because you can't make decisions in the process. Why do you need to? Secondly, stop speaking for us. We can talk for ourselves. Third, stop trying to point out internal contradictions in our communities, we know what they are, we are struggling around them, and I really do not know how white people can be helpful to non- whites to clear these up. Fourth, don't ever say some shit to me about how you feel silenced, marginalized, discriminated against, or put in your place. Period. Finally, start thinking of what it would mean, in terms of actual structured social arrangements, for whiteness and white identity--even the white antiracist kind (because there really is no redeemable or reformed white identity)--to be destroyed. In conclusion, I want to say to anyone who thinks that this is too academic or abstract, I write as a non-white person, meaning that from my body, my person, I experience white supremacy. I also draw my understanding of white supremacy from non-white people, many engaged in various struggles of activism, but most importantly just to speak out and stay alive. They did not get accolades from many for speaking out but instead experienced constant threats on their lives for just existing and doing the work that they did. Moreover, I want to know when a discussion of whiteness, white supremacy and domination became seen as abstract and not rooted in the everyday concrete reality that we experience?